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Abstract
As with other commodity markets, markets for trading pollution permits have not been
immune to market power concerns. In this paper, I survey the existing literature on market
power in permit trading but also contribute with some new results and ideas. I start the
survey with Hahn’s (1984) dominant-firm (static) model that I then extend to the case in
which there are two or more strategic firms that may also strategically interact in the output
market, to the case in which current permits can be stored for future use (as in most existing
and proposed market designs), to the possibility of collusive behavior, and to the case in
which permits are auctioned oﬀ instead of allocated for free to firms. I finish the paper with
a review of empirical evidence on market power, if any, with particular attention to the U.S.
sulfur market and the Southern California NOx market.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Markets for trading pollution rights or permits have attracted increasing attention in the last
decades. The best example is the carbon trading mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol for dealing
with global warming but there are many other experiences.1 As with other commodity markets,
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Research Associate at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research. A preliminary draft of
the paper was presented on July 2008 at the Energy and Environmental Economics Workshop organized by the
University of Vigo. Thanks to Stephen Holland, Matti Liski, Erin Mansur, Tom Tietenberg and two anonymous
referees for comments and discussions. Support from Fondecyt (Grant No. 1095209) and from the Spanish
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1Analysis of the U.S. sulfur market can be found in Ellerman et al (2000), of the California NOx market in
Holland and Moore (2008), of the E.U. Emissions Trading System in Ellerman and Joskow (2008), and of other
permit markets in Tietenberg (1985 and 2006).
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permit markets have not been immune to market power concerns (e.g., Tietenberg, 2006); that
is, the ability of large players to move prices, either unilaterally or collectively. While some of
the existing permit markets are composed by many small agents (e.g., the particulate market
in Santiago-Chile),2 others are not. In the U.S. sulfur market, for example, 43% of the permits
corresponding to the 1995-99 phase were allocated to four firms. In the global carbon markets
that will develop under the Kyoto Protocol and possibly beyond there will be countries with
large shares of permits. In fact, Kyoto allocates a fifth of the (Annex I) permits to Russia and
a third to the U.S.
Some readers may argue that market power should be less of a concern in a global carbon
market because the permits will end up distributed among countless facilities around the world;
none of which with the size to move the market by itself or with the incentives to be part of
a cartel with hundreds of members. But even when a country member ends up allocating its
carbon quota to its domestic firms, which can then be freely traded in the global market, the
country can simultaneously resort to alternative domestic policies to "coordinate" the actions
of its domestics firms very much like a large agent would do. For example, a country that
wants to exercise downward pressure on prices can set a domestic subsidy on cleaner but more
expensive technologies (e.g., some of the renewable energies), and thus, reducing the country’s
aggregate demand for permits in the global market. On the other hand, a country that wants
to exercise upward pressure on prices can levy a tariﬀ on permit exports, and thus, depressing
the country’s aggregate supply of permits. It would be hard to argue against such a measure if
the resulting revenues are aimed at financing R&D on cleaner technologies.3
There is another reason to believe that countries/regions –not individual facilities– are
the relevant players for understanding the exercise of market power in a global market for
carbon permits. As argued by Jaﬀe and Stavins (2009), it is very unlikely to see, at least in
the medium-term, a truly global carbon market with a unique market price but rather multiple
permit markets in diﬀerent countries/regions. These markets will be (imperfectly) linked to
each other so that some exchange of permits will be allowed across markets. Countries, not
individual facilities, will decide through diﬀerent domestic policies how much "linkage" to have
with the rest of the world. Hence, the interesting question is under what circumstances a large
country would find in its best interest to implement domestic policies or market designs (i.e.,
2For a complete description of this program see Montero et al. (2002).
3Alternatively, a country can exercise downward pressure on prices by lowering the actual price faced by its
domestic firms; for example, by giving credits for permits redeemed at compliance.
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introduction of safety valves, subsidies, standards, etc.) that would work as if the country
were exercising market power in a truly global market. Or alternatively put, if we observe the
implementation of domestic policies that prevent a perfect linkage among the diﬀerent permit
markets to what extent we can claim that these policies are driven by a genuine interest in
altering international prices or rather they are the result of internal domestic forces (politics)
unrelated to market power.
Answers to the above questions requires, at least, understanding of how and to what extent
a large agent, either acting individually or collectively, can move prices away from competitive
levels (at times I will exchange strategic agent for large agent and firm for agent or player).
Starting with Hahn’s (1984) pioneering article, there is a significant amount of work now ad-
dressing these matters. This survey article reviews that literature. With few exceptions, which
I cover at the end, the survey is mainly theoretical. As observed in almost all existing markets,
for most part of the survey I work under the assumption that permits are allocated for free
to firms. I do however, discuss how results change when permits are auctioned oﬀ. In this
same section I let the regulator know little about firms’ relevant characteristics (i.e., abatement
costs). In the concluding section I briefly touch on some instrument choice considerations; for
example, the extent to which a permit instrument may look inferior to alternative instruments
(e.g., taxes) because of potential market power problems. In addition, I assume throughout
that pollution is perfectly observable by the regulator (i.e., no hidden action) and that there is
complete enforcement of the regulation.4
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, Section 2, I present the
basic problem of a large polluting firm and a fringe of small polluting firms in a static setting.
In Section 3, I extend the basic model to allow for two or more large firms that may also
interact in imperfectly competitive output markets. In Section 4, I consider a dynamic permit
market with storable permits and allocations that decline over time, so in principle, agents
can smooth compliance costs by storing current vintage permits for later use. In Section 5, I
drop the assumption that permits are grandfathered to firms and assume instead that they are
auctioned oﬀ. The scant empirical evidence on market power in permit trading is reviewed in
Section 6. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.
4See van Egteren and Weber (1996) and Chavez and Stralund (2003) for extensions of Hahn’s (1984) model
to the case of incomplete enforcement. There seems to be no paper, however, studying market power in the
presence of moral hazard (i.e., imperfect monitoring of emissions).
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2 THE BASIC MODEL
Hahn (1984) was the first to formally study market power in permit trading. He considers a
large polluting firm and a fringe of small polluting firms in a static framework. Hahn (1984)
abstracts from the output market by assuming that all polluting firms take output prices as
given. Pollution permits are allocated for free to firms and must be used in the same period
for which they were issued. So, even if firms interact for several periods the restriction that
permits cannot be stored for future use and/or that firms cannot borrow from future allocations
make it a static problem (this is not necessarily the case if instead of having one large firm we
have a few large firms trying to sustain collusion from their repeated interactions). Hahn (1984)
shows that market power vanishes when the permit allocation of the large agent is exactly equal
to its "eﬃcient allocation", i.e., its emissions under perfectly competitive pricing. Hence, an
allocation diﬀerent than the eﬃcient allocation results in either monopoly or monopsony power.
To formally see Hahn’s insight consider a period with two stages. In the first stage, the
large firm, which we denote by "m", announces a permits spot sale or purchase of xm (we will
adopt the convention that x > 0 for sales and x < 0 for purchases). Having observed xm,
fringe firms, which we denote by "f", clear the market in the second stage by buying/selling
xf = −xm permits. Let Cm(qm) be the large firm’s cost of abating qf units of pollution from
some unrestricted level of emissions um to em = um − qm and where C 0m > 0 and C 00m > 0.
Similarly, let Cf (qf ) be the fringe’s aggregate cost of abating pollution from the unrestricted
level uf to ef = uf − qf and where C 0f > 0 and C 00f > 0. In addition, let am and af be the
permit allocations to the large firm and fringe firms, respectively. To make the problem relevant
am + af < um + uf . In deciding its spot sale/purchase, the large firm, acting as a Stackelberg
leader, solves
max
xm
p(xm)xm − Cm(qm) (1)
where p(xm) is the market clearing price.
Fringe firms operate along their static reaction function, that is, p(xm) = C 0f (qf ), where
qf = uf − af − xm. Likewise, full compliance requires qm = um − am + xm. Replacing these
expressions into (1) and solving we obtain the equilibrium condition
C 0f (qf )− xmC 00f (qf )− C 0m(qm) = 0 (2)
that requires marginal revenues (the first two terms) to be equal to marginal costs. If in
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equilibrium xm = 0, then we obtain the perfectly competitive pricing condition of equating
marginal costs across firms. For xm = 0 to happen in equilibrium we require the allocation am
to be exactly equal to the large firm’s perfectly competitive emissions, that is, e∗m = um − q∗m,
where q∗m solves C
0
f (q
∗
f ) = C
0
m(q
∗
m). In this case, only fringe firms engage in permit trading
clearing the market at p = C 0f (q
∗
f ). When am > e
∗
m, the large firm exercises monopoly power
by selling less and abating more than what is socially eﬃcient. Conversely, when am < e∗m, the
large firm exercises monopsony power by buying less and abating more than what is socially
eﬃcient.
Starting with Hahn, market power in permit trading has always been understood as how
the initial allocation of free permits aﬀect firms’ compliance and trading decisions. So, in
principle, a completely informed regulator could alleviate market power concerns by allocating
permits in a cost-eﬀective manner. But rarely that completely informed regulator exists, and if
it does, political economy considerations (e.g., Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998) prevents him to
constantly making allocation adjustments as to stick to a cost-eﬀective allocation rule. While
extremely insightful, Hahn’s model provides incomplete understanding of market power in more
real-world settings, namely, when there two or more strategic firms, when large polluters also
interact in (concentrated) output markets, when agents are engaged in dynamic and/or repeated
interactions, and when part or all of the permits are not allocated for free but auctioned oﬀ.
We turn to those cases now.
3 EXTENDING THE BASIC MODEL
In this section we extend the basic model to allow for two or more strategic agents that may
or may not interact in the output market but retain the static nature of their interactions.
3.1 Multiple Strategic Agents
For now let us keep the assumption that the output market is perfectly competitive but consider
that there are two or more large agents buying and selling permits. This would apply, for
example, to permits markets with few polluting agents that sell their output in international
(large) markets or at regulated prices. (I will later introduce a case of three paper and pulp
mills and two wastewater treatment plants discharging biochemical oxygen demand into a river
in southern Chile).
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A natural way to handle multiple large firms would be through a straightforward transfor-
mation of Hahn’s model into a Cournot-type game. I believe this approach was first used by
Westskog (1996) to investigate market power in an international carbon market with countries
as players. For simplicity consider two large firms, i and j, and a competitive fringe. We
maintain the notation and timing of the basic model, i.e., i and j decide first and simultane-
ously their permit sales/purchases xi and xj and then fringe firms clear the market. The Nash
equilibrium of the game is found by solving for both i and j
max
xi2
p(xi, xj)xi −Ci(qi)
where p(xi, xj) = C 0f (qf ), qf = u
f −af −xi−xj and qi = ui−ai+xi. In equilibrium, marginal
revenues must be equal to marginal costs, that is
C 0f (qf )− xiC 00f (qf )− C 0i(qi) = 0 (3)
for both i and j. Consistent with Hahn, market power disappears only when each and every
strategic firm receives an allocation exactly equal to its cost-eﬀective pollution level, i.e., ai = e∗i
for all i.
Some observations are worth noting about this oligopoly-fringe model. The first is that the
fringe must be rather large for the model to work well. Unlike the Cournot model or Hahn’s
model, the oligopoly-fringe model does not have a clearing price for the case in which large firms’
net position cannot be absorbed by the fringe. It is not obvious that the price would go to the
backstop price (i.e., price at which firms can switch to a zero-emissions technology) when the
fringe is short in permits, i.e., −xi−xj = xf > af , or that the price would collapse to zero when
there is an excess of permits, i.e., xi + xj = −xf > uf . More importantly, even if we restrict
large firms’ action space to −af < xi+xj < uf , the model has poor predictive capabilities. An
example may clarify things. Take, for example, Ci(q) = Cj(q) = q2, ui = uj = 1, Cf (q) = γq2
and uf = u. The regulatory goal is to halve pollution from its unrestricted levels, that is,
ai+ aj + af = 1+ u/2. Consider first the case in which the fringe of polluters is comparable to
one of the strategic firms in terms of cost and unrestricted emissions (γ = u = 1) and ai = 1,
aj = 0 and af = 1/2. The oligopoly-fringe model predicts an equilibrium price equal to the
cost-eﬀective level, p = 1, and trading volume by the large firms equal to xi = −xj = 1/4,
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which is half the cost-eﬀective level.5 On net, the fringe does not trade since its receives its
cost-eﬀective allocation. Here the model seems to capture large agents’ behavior reasonably
well: large agents want to trade less than they would in perfect competition.
Let us now consider an almost negligible fringe: u = 10−3, af = 5× 10−4 and γ = 103. The
oligopoly-fringe model still predicts the cost-eﬀective price, p = 1, and not trading by the fringe
(i.e., fringe has just enough permits to cover its emissions when p = 1). However, it predicts
virtually no trading activity by the large firms, xi = −xj = 5 × 10−4, which implies that in
equilibrium qi ≈ 0 and qj ≈ 1. The logic is simple. Since the fringe’s response becomes infinitely
elastic when it vanishes (i.e., |p0| or C00f →∞), a large seller (buyer) wants to sell (buy) virtually
nothing in order to prevent a high drop (increase) in prices. By forcing large firms to satisfy
(3) regardless of the fringe’s size, the model rules out by construction any bilateral interaction
among large firms, which would be a main trading channel in a market with a small fringe.
Thus, the oligopoly-fringe model produces an unreasonably expensive abatement pattern. In
the example above, the oligopoly-fringe model predicts aggregate abatement costs twice as large
as if we let firms to Nash-bargain over the permits.
In a forthcoming paper, Malueg and Yates (2009) develop a model that deals precisely
with a permit market in which there are only strategic players.6 They do not motivate their
paper upon the observation that the oligopoly-fringe model works poorly but rather upon the
observation that for some permit markets the oligopoly-fringe structure may not apply. The
water-pollution problem mentioned above is a good example. Borrowing from the work of
Hendricks and McAﬀe (2009), which, in turn, is based on the supply-function-equilibria model
of Klemperer and Meyer (1998), Malueg and Yates (2009) consider a game in which a number
of strategic polluters submit a linear net-trade schedule to a "market maker", which aggregates
schedules and clears the market at a uniform price p. For a given initial allocation of permits,
a net-trade schedule indicates how many (additional) permits the firm is willing to buy/sell
as a function of the clearing price p. Since the total amount of permits is fixed, the model is
very close to the auction of shares of Wilson (1979). The authors’ model also imposes Wilson’s
restrictions of linear schedule and one degree of freedom (in Wilson’s model firms can only
vary the slope of their bidding schedules while in the authors’ model they can only vary the
5The cost-eﬀective solution is given by qi = qj = qf = 1/2 and p = 1. The fact that the oligopoly-fringe model
predicts the cost-eﬀective price is a consequence of the symmetry of the problem. For example, the equilibrium
price would drop to 3/4 if instead we use ai = 1/2, aj = 0 and af = 1.
6Using a similar approach, Lange (2008) also let all polluting agents, regardless of their size, be strategic
agents.
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intercept).7
Malueg and Yates’ (2009) model is a valuable addition towards our understanding of market
power in oligopoly environments. Like in Wilson (1979), the model has a unique equilibrium
where buyers find it optimal to report schedules below their true ones –as an attempt to lower
prices– and sellers find it optimal to do just the opposite. Because of this strategic reporting,
the amount of trading activity is below the cost-eﬀective level but, unlike in the oligopoly-fringe
model, still positive and significant. As we increase the number of strategic firms, we approach
truthful reporting and with that cost-eﬀectiveness. As in Hahn, cost-eﬀectiveness can be also
be obtained for any number of firms with an allocation that exhibits no trading in equilibrium.
Despite these reasonable predictive properties, Malueg and Yates’ (2009) model is not entirely
satisfactory either. To start, the model predicts an equilibrium price exactly equal to the cost-
eﬀective level for any number of firms and regardless of the initial allocations of permits. This is
in part due to restriction of linear schedules with one degree of freedom (I wonder whether this
result would change if instead of the intercept firms were able to freely choose the slope; also,
letting the slope vary instead of the intercept makes it possible to add a fringe of suppliers).
Other than for modeling convenience, there is no reason to restrict a firm’s decision to a
single variable. But if we let firms freely choose the slope and intercept of their (still) linear net-
trade schedules that would most probably result –as shown by Milgrom (2005) for the Wilson’s
share auction– in multiple equilibria including the perfectly competitive one. I see nothing
particular in permit trading that could rule out the multiplicity. That would leave us with
rather weak theories of permit trading in oligopoly settings. The problem is that if empirical
estimations show indeed departure from marginal cost pricing we would not be sure how much
of this departure is caused by the initial allocation of permits and how much by reasons not
captured by current models. It would be hard to write policy prescriptions regarding allocations
when we do not know the answer to this question.
3.2 Interaction with the Product Market
Hahn (1984) assumes that polluting firms sell their the products in perfectly competitive mar-
kets. In some cases this may not be a good assumption. Some of the large countries in an
eventual global carbon market are also big players in energy markets (e.g., Hagem and Maes-
7More precisely, Wilson’s model can be interpreted as one in which firms’ only choice is the slope of their
(linear) bidding schedules after their intercepts have been fixed at 1/(n− 1), where n is the number of firms.
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tad, 2005). The NOx permit market in California is another example. Nearly 25% of the NOx
permits were allocated to facilities that sell power into the California electricity market, which
has been recognized for its (unilateral) market power problems (e.g., Borenstein et al., 2002;
Joskow and Kahn, 2002). In fact, Kolstad and Wolak (2008) argue that electric utilities used
the NOx market to enhance their ability to exercise (unilateral) market power in the electricity
market. I will come back to this result in Section 6.
The interesting question here is how a permits market may exacerbate market power prob-
lems in other markets and vice versa.8 Misiolek and Elder (1989) were the first to notice that in
addition to the Hahn’s eﬀect there may be incentives for large firms to manipulate the permits
market in an eﬀort to raise their rival’s costs in the output market –just like in Salop and
Scheﬀman (1983). Extending Hahn’s market structure to the output market, Misiolek and El-
der (1989) argue that the large firm now has incentives to sell less (or buy more) than in Hahn’s
pollution-trading model. The authors note that depending on the initial allocation of permits,
this additional strategic eﬀect can sometimes worsen and sometimes alleviate the ineﬃciencies
identified by Hahn. Sartzetakis (1997) and von der Fehr (1993), among others, extend the
insights of Misiolek and Elder (1989) to oligopolistic settings and discuss when raising rivals’
costs could be in fact a profitable strategy.9
My problem here is that unlike previous authors I do not see so clearly that the raising
rivals’ costs eﬀect can alter the permits trading pattern in a significant way as to be able to
infer something from the empirical data. Based on the insights of Misiolek and Elder (1989),
for example, one may argue that all else equal a large polluting source exercising (unilateral)
market power in the output market is more likely to be a buyer of permits than an equally
large polluting source acting competitively in the output market. It is interesting to notice that
some of the large polluting sources in the U.S. sulfur market sell their output in concentrated
deregulated electricity markets and happen to be net buyers in the permits market (more on
the sulfur market in Section 6). Can this empirical observation be interpreted as an indication
of market power in both markets? I do not think the theory supports that claim.
A simple extension of Hahn’s model may clarify my point. Let the large firm’s output
8See Requate (2005) for a complete discussion on the performance of other environmental policy instruments
such as taxes and standards in the presence of imperfectly competitive output markets.
9Motivated by the structure of the EU ETS market, Sanin and Zanaj (2009) study a diﬀerent yet interesting
problem. They look at the interaction of a continuum of imperfectly competitive output markets with a perfectly
competitive permits market. They show that because of imperfect competition in the output markets there may
be cases in which permit prices can increase with the adoption of cleaner technologies.
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be denoted by ym and the fringe’s by yf . For simplicity production costs are separable from
abatement costs and are denoted by Km(ym) and Kf (yf ), respectively. Unrestricted emissions
are equal to um = ym and uf = yf . This pollution-production characterization would fit well
the U.S. sulfur and California NOx markets, for example. Acting as a Stackelberg leader in both
the permit and output market,10 the large firm announces first how many permits to trade, xm,
and how much output, ym, to bring to the product market. Having observed that, fringe firms
announce their output, yf , and clear the permits market by buying xf = −xm. Consumers
clear the output market according to the inverse demand R(ym+yf ). The equilibrium solution
can be found by maximizing the large firm’s profits
max
xm,ym
p(xm)xm +R(ym + yf )ym −Km(ym)−Cm(qm) (4)
subject to the equilibrium conditions p(xm) = C 0f (qf ) and R(ym + yf ) = K
0
f (yf ) + C
0
f (qf ).
Note that the latter condition requires that at the margin the output price must cover fringe’s
production and abatement costs.
The equilibrium outcome can be found by backward induction as follows. For a given a
transfer of xm permits from the large firm to the fringe at the competitive price p(xm), which
will be determined later, the large firm solves
max
ym
R(ym + yf )ym −Km(ym)− Cm(qm)
leading to the first-order condition (recall that qm = ym − am + xm)
R+R0(·)
µ
1 +
dyf (ym)
dym
¶
ym −K 0m(ym)−C 0m(qm) = 0 (5)
where dyf (ym)/dym = R0/(K 00f +C
00
f −R0) < 0 captures the fringe’s downward sloping reaction
function to an increase in the large firm’s production.11 Solving we obtain the (subgame)
equilibrium quantities as a function of xm: ym(xm), yf (xm), qm(xm) = ym(xm)− am+ xm and
qf (xm) = yf (xm)− af − xm.
Moving backwards, the large firm now chooses xm to maximize (4) but anticipating the
10Results do not qualitatively change if we let firms to simulatneously announce their porduction quanitites.
11The expression for dyf/dym is obtained from totally diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition R(ym + yf ) =
K0f (yf ) +C
0
f (qf ) with respect to ym and using qf = yf − af − xm. Further, dyf/dym would have been zero had
we assumed simultaneous move in the output market.
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eﬀect that its choice will have subsequently on output and abatement. Using the envelope
theorem and p(xm) = C 0f (qf ), the FOC for xm becomes
C0f (qf )− C 00f (qf )
½
1− dyf
dxm
¾
xm − C 0m(qm) +R0ym
·
dyf
dxm
− dyf (ym)
dym
dym(xm)
dxm
¸
= 0 (6)
Expressions for 1 > dyf (xm)/dxm > 0 and −1 < dym(xm)/dxm < 0 can be obtained by totally
diﬀerentiating (5) and R(ym + yf ) = K 0f (yf ) + C
0
f (qf ) with respect to xm.
12 The new terms
not included in Hahn’s model, i.e., equation (3), are in brackets. The curly bracket is less than
one, although still positive, capturing the fact that the permit price is less sensitive to changes
in xm because the fringe now accommodates both output and abatement. This demand eﬀect
induces the large firm to sell more permits than otherwise because it would not fall as much.
The last term in (6) captures the raising rival’s cost eﬀect, which has the opposite sign, that
is, it induces the large firm to sell fewer permits than otherwise. Selling permits to the fringe
increases its output supply (dyf/dxm > 0) which in turn depresses the output price R. As
indicated by the second term in the square brackets, this eﬀect is somehow diminished by the
Stackelberg timing in the output market; under Cournot timing dyf (ym)/dym = 0.
It is hard to see from (5) and particularly (6) the extent to which the introduction of the
output market alters the trading pattern of the large firm. For that let us adopt some functional
forms and numbers. Let Cm(q) = Cf (q) = q2, Km(y) = Cf (y) = y2, and R(ym + yf ) =
10 − ym − yf . Suppose further an environmental constraint equal to am + af = 2. Given the
symmetry of the problem we know from Hahn that when the large firm behaves competitively
in the output market an even allocation of permits, i.e., am = af = 1, would lead to competitive
pricing in both markets.13 The perfectly competitive outcome is presented in the first column
of Table 1. If we now return to our model of market power in both markets, we observe in
the second column of Table 1 that both equilibrium prices are above competitive levels but
the amount of permit trading has remained unchanged at zero.14 In terms of the amount of
12Note also that
dyf (ym)
dym
dym(xm)
dxm
6= dyf (xm)
dxm
To see why note that had we assumed Cournot timing in the ouput market dyf (ym)/dym would have been zero
but dyf (xm)/dxm would have been still positive.
13Formally, under competitive pricing equation (5) changes to R = K0m(ym) +C
0
m(qm) and (6) to
C
0
f (qf )− C00f (qf )
½
1− dyf
dxm
¾
xm − C0m(qm) +R0ym
·
dym
dxm
+
dyf
dxm
¸
= 0
And for our symmetric-linear setting we have dym/dxm = −dyf/dxm = −1/2.
14Note that for the adopted functional forms we have dym/dxm = −3/7 and dym/dxm = 17/35.
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permit trading, the raising rival’s cost eﬀect has been fully oﬀset by both the demand eﬀect
already detected in equation (6) but also by the large firm’s (strategic) output contraction
which increases its permits supply. This full-oﬀsetting result carries on to diﬀerent permits
allocations, as shown in the remaining columns of Table 1. Obviously this result is in part
specific to our setting but it does raise the issue that is not evident how the introduction of
imperfect competition in the output market changes the way large firms trade permits. It seems
that the empirical test that one would apply to the data, when available, must be very specific
to the case in hand.
4 DYNAMIC INTERACTIONS
We now take our discussion to a dynamic setting. This is relevant when permits are storable,
as occurs in most markets, and/or when two or more strategic firms are engaged in a repeated
interaction. I discuss both cases next.
4.1 Storable Permits
A common feature in most existing and proposed pollution market designs is the future tight-
ening of emission limits accompanied by firms’ possibility to store today’s unused permits for
use in later periods. This design was used in the U.S. sulfur market but global trading pro-
posals for dealing with carbon dioxide emissions will likely have similar characteristics.15 It
is true that we do not know yet the type of regulatory institutions –including policy instru-
ments and participants– that will succeed the Kyoto Protocol in the multinational eﬀorts to
stabilize carbon emissions and concentrations in the atmosphere. At this point all we know is
that regardless of the regulatory mechanism adopted, there will be a long transition period of
a few decades between now and the time of stabilization. But if this transition period is gov-
erned by a Kyoto-type market mechanism, then, the global carbon market that will eventually
develop will have many of the properties that are discussed in this section. In anticipation of
a tighter emission limit, it is in the firms’ own interest to store permits from the early permit
allocations and build up a stock of permits that can then be gradually consumed until reaching
the long-run emissions limit. This build-up and gradual consumption of a stock of permits give
15Already in the early programs of the 1980s like the U.S. lead phasedown trading program and the U.S. EPA
trading program firms were allowed to store permits under the so-called "banking" provisions — provisions that
were extensively used (Tietenberg, 2006).
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rise to a dynamic market that shares many, but not all, of the properties of a conventional
exhaustible-resource market (Hotelling, 1931).
Using a two-period model, Hagem and Westskog (1998) were the first to consider this
dynamic problem for the Hahn’s market structure.16 Unfortunately, a two-period model leaves
important elements outside the analysis; for example, the possibility of a period of time in
which only one firm is holding stock. In a forthcoming paper, Liski and Montero (2009a)
study the subgame properties of the equilibrium path of a multi-period permit market with
Hahn’s structure. Agents, the large firm and the competitive fringe, receive for free a very
generous allocation of permits for a few periods and then an allocation equal, in aggregate, to
the long-term emissions goal established by the regulation, which is given by the (constant)
flow allocation am+ af . The generous allocation of the first few periods is captured by a (one-
time) stock allocation of s0 = sm0 + s
f
0 . Liski and Montero (2009a) are particularly interested
in understanding the exercise of market power during the transition phase, i.e., during the
stock depletion phase, and how it depends on the initial distribution of the stock, sm0 and s
f
0 ,
among the diﬀerent parties. The existing literature provides little guidance on how individual
endowments relate to market power in a dynamic setting with storable endowments. Agents
in their model not only decide on how to sell the stock over time, as in any conventional
exhaustible-resource market, but also how to consume it as to cover their own emissions. In
addition, since permits can be stored at no cost (other than the opportunity cost), agents are
free to either deplete or build up their own stocks.
If we let p¯ be the long-run equilibrium price of permits,17 Liski and Montero (2009a) find
that when the large firm receives a suﬃciently large fraction of the initial stock, this agent
becomes a net seller of permits along a subgame perfect equilibrium path that is qualitatively
not diﬀerent than the path followed by a large seller of a conventional exhaustible resources
with a choke price of p¯ (Salant, 1976).18 As shown in Figure 1, the manipulated equilibrium
16The perfectly competitive solution was already documented by Rubin (1996).
17To concentrate exclusively on market power during the transition phase assume that am and af are cost-
eﬀective allocations, that is,
p¯ = C0m(q
m
t = u
m − am) = C0f (qft = uf − af )
Alternatively, one can assume that the long-run emissions goal is suﬃciently tight that the long-run equilibrium
price is fully governed by the price of backstop technologies, which would be p¯. This seems to a be a reasonable
assumption for the carbon market. Nevertheless, Liski and Montero (2009a) allowed for long-run market power
in one of their extensions.
18Note that Liski and Montero’s (2009a) model is very diﬀerent from Salant’s in that they view firms as coming
to the market in each period instead of making a one-time quantity-path announcement at the beginning of the
game.
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price path pm is initially higher than the competitive level (denoted by p∗) and grows at the
rate of interest, r, as long as the fringe is holding stock. Right after the fringe stock is exhausted
at T f , the manipulated price grows at a lower rate. As a monopoly stockholder, the large firm
is now equalizing marginal revenues rather than prices in present value until the end of the
storage period, Tm. The dashed line shows how marginal revenues, which are equal to marginal
costs in each period, evolve over time. The exercise of market power implies extended overall
exhaustion time, Tm > T ∗, where T ∗ is the socially optimal exhaustion period for the overall
stock s0, as defined by the Hotelling (arbitrage, terminal and exhaustion) conditions. Thus,
the large agent manipulates the market by saving too much of the stock, which shifts the initial
abatement burden towards the fringe and leads to initially higher prices.
When sm0 is suﬃciently large for the large firm to be a net seller during the depletion
(i.e., transition) phase, the latter has no problems in solving the two-dimensional objective
of intertemporal permit revenue maximization and abatement cost minimization in a credible
(i.e., subgame-perfect) manner. As we reduce the initial stock allocation to the large agent (and
increase sf0), there is a point in which the revenue maximization objective drops out and the
large agent stops trading with the rest of the market; it only uses its stock to minimize costs
while reaching the long-run emissions target am+af . This point is when sm0 is exactly equal to
the "eﬃcient allocation", i.e., the allocation profile that would cover the large agent’s emissions
along the perfectly competitive path.
When the large agent’s stock falls below its eﬃcient allocation, and hence, becomes a net
buyer in the market, it has great diﬃculties in credibly committing to a purchasing path that
would keep prices below their competitive levels as Hahn’s monopsonist would do. The large
agents suﬀers from a Coase conjecture (Coase, 1972; Bulow, 1982). Any eﬀort to depress prices
below competitive levels would make fringe members to maintain a larger stock in response to
their (correct) expectation of a later appreciation of permits. Figure 2 may help. The perfectly
competitive price path is again denoted by p∗. Ask now, what would be the optimal purchase
path for the large agent if it could fully commit to it at time t = 0? Since letting the large
agent choose a spot purchase path is equivalent to letting it go to the spot market for a one-
time stock purchase at time t = 0, conventional monopsony arguments would show that the
large agent’s optimal one-time stock purchase is strictly smaller than its purchases along the
competitive path p∗. The new equilibrium price path would be p2 and the fringe’s stock would
be exhausted at T2 > T ∗. The large agent’s internal price (i.e., its marginal cost), on the other
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hand, would move along path p1 and its own stock would be exhausted at T1 < T ∗ (recall that
all three paths p∗, p1 and p2 rise at the rate of interest). But players come to the spot market
more than once implying that p1 and p2 are not time consistent (i.e., they violate subgame
perfection). The easiest way to see this is by observing that at time T1 the large agent would
like to make additional purchases, which would drive prices up. Since fringe members anticipate
and arbitrate this price jump, the actual equilibrium path would lie somewhere between p2 and
p∗ (and p1 closer to p∗ as well). Moreover, since the large agent has the opportunity to move
not twice but in each and every period, one can very well conjecture that the time-consistent
path may come close, if not equal, to the perfectly competitive path p∗.
In a related paper, Liski and Montero (2009b) study the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the more conventional problem of a monopsonist of an exhaustible-resource playing against
a fringe of suppliers that have no internal demand for the resource. Unlike in the durable-
good-monopoly analog, they show that the monopsonist can indeed depress prices in (subgame
perfect) equilibrium but at the expense of delaying the adoption of the backstop technology (i.e.,
reaching the price of a substitute at which demand for the exhaustible resource disappears).
As this latter cost increases, the subgame perfect equilibrium comes closer to the perfectly
competitive one. But if the adoption of the backstop technology reports no benefit to the
monopsonist (i.e., zero cost of postponing its adoption), the latter can credibly postpone the
adoption of the backstop technology indefinitely, and hence, commit to the monopsony price
path –very much like a durable good monopolist that can credibly commit to the monopoly
path when it faces a stock of consumers with constant valuation.
The pollution model of Liski and Montero (2009a) is somehow diﬀerent than the one in Liski
and Montero (2009b) for two reasons specific to the pollution context: (i) the presence of many
small polluting agents that free-ride on the large agent’s eﬀort to depress permit prices (i.e.,
the seller side is also consuming from the remaining stock of permits) and (ii) the substantial
cost the large agent may incur from postponing the arrival of the long-run equilibrium (unless
the long-run goal is a total phase out of pollution). Because of these two reasons the scope for
market (buyer) power is considerably reduced in the pollution market.
A numerical example may help to illustrate how the market dynamics introduced by the
stock allocations brings a sharp distinction between the seller and the buyer (which does not
arise in Hahn’s static context). The large agent and the fringe are identical in all respects
but in stock allocations. We assume linear marginal costs, C 0m(q) = C 0f (q) = q, and constant
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unrestricted emissions, uf = um = 2. In each period t ∈ [0,∞), firms receive a flow allocation
equal to af = am = 1. In addition to the flow allocations, firms receive an overall stock
allocation at t = 0 of s0 = s
f
0 + s
m
0 = 5. The (continuous-time) interest rate is r = 0.1.
Note that because of the symmetry in costs and allocations, in the long-run, i.e., once stocks
have been fully depleted, firms are in perfect competition (p¯ = qf = qm = 1). The idea of
the numerical exercise is to compare the perfectly competitive path (that results from stock
allocations sf0 = s
m
0 = 2.5) to the subgame perfect paths associated to two extreme stock
allocations: (i) the large agent receives no stock (pure monopsony: sm0 = 0) and (ii) the large
agent receives the full stock (pure monopoly: sm0 = 5).
In carrying out the exercise it is useful to start with the artificial assumption that the large
agent is restricted to trade only once with the market at t = 0 (the large agent can and will
engage in a stock transaction). In the monopsony case, the large agent buys 1.79 units of the
overall stock at t = 0 leading to the paths of Figure 2 with T1 = 6.6 and T2 = 9.2 (note also that
T ∗ = 8.0). The same paths of Figure 2 serve to explain the monopoly solution as well: the large
agent sells only 1.44 units of its stock to the fringe, so he internally follows path p2 exhausting at
T2 = 9.8 while the fringe follows path p1 exhausting at T1 = 5.9. It is not surprising from what
we know from the static model, that the monopoly and monopsony solutions in this (artificial)
one-shot game almost mirror each other with similar welfare consequences.19
Let us remove now the one-time trading restriction and look for the true subgame perfect
equilibrium paths. As shown in the second row of Table 2, the monopsonist is able to only
slightly depress the initial price from its competitive level of 0.449 to 0.429 and extend the
exhaustion time by only 6 per cent (from 8.0 to 8.5). The monopsonist is clearly better oﬀ
with the one-time trading restriction because that provides him with the commitment he does
not have. As a good indication of this commitment problem, we see that the overall eﬃciency
loss –total cost above those under perfect competition– under full monopsony is only 7 per
cent. Moving to the other extreme allocation, it is immediately clear that the monopolist
greatly benefits from having removed the one-time trading restriction (since the latter is always
available to him). It is more profitably for the monopolist to gradually sell permits to the
fringe rather than selling everything at once. Relative to the perfectly competitive solution,
we observe a considerable increase in both the initial price and the exhaustion time (55 and 19
19The two solutions do not exactly mirror each other because the price reaction funtion of the fringe is not
linear in the stock, as in the static case.
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per cent, respectively). Not surprisingly, this leads to a significant welfare loss of 28 per cent.
In sum, dynamics (the opportunity of gradually and frequently come to the market) helps the
large seller but severely hurts the buyer.
4.2 Collusive Behavior
There is not much to add here to what we already know on collusive behavior except for the
case in which there is storability of permits. Two or more sellers of permits could potentially
sustain the monopoly path pm in Figure 1 only if the cartel persists after Tm. Then, collusion
could in principle be ruled out if the long-run allocations are cost-eﬀective or if the long-run
price is fully governed by the price of backstop technologies. Similarly, it is not clear how a large
buyer could escape from the Coase conjecture of Figure 2. Unlike the durable-good monopoly,
the existence of the backstop (i.e., long-run) price p¯ together with the fact the stocks are in
the hands of the fringe rule out the construction of punishment strategies a la Ausubel and
Deneckere (1987) and Gul (1987) that could support the monopsony path. Fringe’s rational
expectations do not support a price path that never reaches p¯ but approaches it asymptotically
because the latter would require prices to be declining in present value terms.
5 AUCTIONING THE PERMITS
So far we have assumed that permits are allocated for free (i.e., grandfathered) to firms. It is
true that auctions have been nearly absent from all existing permit markets but recently they
have received more attention as an alternative way to allocate permits –perhaps not all but an
important fraction of them (e.g., Crampton and Kerr, 2002).20 One of the strongest arguments
in favor of auctioning is its revenue recycling properties, i.e., the possibility of using the auction
revenues to reduce distortionary taxation somewhere else in the economy (e.g., Bovenberg and
Goulder, 1996). In this section we will stay away from these general equilibrium considerations
and we will exclusively focus on strategic manipulation of auction prices. Unlike with the free
allocation, an auction scheme has the potential to eliminate manipulation incentives for all
firms even when the regulator knows little or nothing about the firms. The regulator’s task is
then to design the right auction mechanism. The section starts with a theoretical discussion
20 In the US sulfur market, for example, less than 3% of the overall allocation is auctioned oﬀ every year.
Auctions are more common in other resource management problems, e.g., for allocating water rights and fishing
quotas (Tietenberg, 2006).
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and concludes with a numerical application to water pollution in the Bio-Bio River in southern
Chile.
5.1 Some Theory
To start, suppose that a total number of permits are to be allocated via a sealed-bid, uniform-
price auction in which each firm bids a demand schedule indicating the number of permits willing
to purchase at any given price. Note that the uniform-price auction is the closest auction design
to the permit markets we have studied so far since all permits are bought at the same price.
The problem with uniform-price auctions is that nothing guarantees that firms will reach the
perfectly competitive outcome (Milgrom, 2004); although it is one of the multiple equilibria.
As first recognized by Wilson (1979) in his pioneer "auctions of shares" article, even when there
is a large number of bidders, uniform price auctions can exhibit Nash equilibria with prices far
below the competitive price (the price that would prevail if all bidders submit their true demand
curves for permits). The reason for this is that uniform pricing creates strong incentives for
bidders to (non-cooperatively) shade their bids at the auction in order to depress the price they
pay for their inframarginal units.
But if bidders anticipate the perfectly competitive outcome at the uniform-price auction,
a large firm may still have incentives to refrain from participating at the auction (i.e., submit
an empty schedule) and only trade in the after-auction (i.e., resale) market. Consider Hahn’s
market structure and let Pm(em) and Pf (ef ) be the true (inverse) demand curves for permits of
the large firm and the fringe, respectively. Note that for convenience in the presentation I have
switched from marginal abatement cost curves to demand curves, so Pi(ei) = C0i(qi = ui − ei).
As depicted in Figure 3, suppose that the regulator’s environmental goal is to allocate a total
of e0 permits. To simplify the graphical analysis, suppose further that Pm(em) = Pf (ef ), which
implies that in the absence of regulation unrestricted emissions are uf = um = u > e0/2. The
aggregate true demand curve is denoted by Pmf (emf ). If all firms were to behave competitively
(i.e., bid their true demands), the clearing price of the uniform-price auction would be p∗ and
firms will receive ef = em = e∗ permits. These would be firms’ emissions as well. There is
no reason for after-auction trading since the large firm has exactly its cost-eﬀective allocation.
Thus, the large firm’s total compliance cost with the regulation would be the sum of two
components: abatement costs or profit loss (area under Pm(em) from e∗ to u) and permit
purchasing costs (p∗ times e∗).
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But the large firm can do better by bidding an empty demand schedule at the auction
and buying permits only in the resale market. Regardless of the price paid by the fringe at the
auction–zero if they bid competitively–, the fringe’s supply curve in the resale market is Sf (e),
that is, Sf is the price at which the fringe is willing to supply e permits (or simpler, Sf is the
fringe’s marginal abatement cost curve). The large firm’s optimal permit order is em < e∗, where
its marginal purchasing cost is equal to its marginal benefit, i.e., Sf (em)+S0f (em)em = Pm(em).
The large firm’s compliance costs has fallen because the increase in abatement costs (area under
Pm(em) from em to u) is more than oﬀset by the decrease in permit purchasing costs (pm
times em). I do not want to insist here on the generality of this result (e.g., what if we have
two strategic players?); it seems enough for illustrating that a standard uniform-price auction
is unlikely to eliminate incentives for (unilateral) price manipulation (later we will touch on
collusion incentives as well).
One radical solution to solve the manipulation problem is to give up the uniform-price
format altogether and opt for a discriminatory-price format (e.g., Vickrey, 1961). But if we
want to retain the uniform-price format, in part because of its simplicity, Montero (2008) has
recently proposed a relatively simple way to fix the problem: allow for rebates or paybacks. Part
of the (uniform-price) auction revenues are returned to firms not as lump sum transfers but in
a way that firms would have incentives to bid truthfully regardless of their size. More precisely,
firms’ final payments (after rebates) are computed following a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
principle, that is, making each firm pay exactly for the externality it imposes on the remaining
agents.21 Because of the VCG payoﬀ structure, this new uniform-price auction becomes both
ex-post eﬃcient and strategy-proof (i.e., telling the truth is a dominant strategy). Note that
since the equilibrium is implemented in dominant strategies, firms and the regulator need know
nothing about (other) firms’ characteristics for the scheme to work.
The workings of Montero’s (2008) auction scheme can be easily illustrated with the problem
of Figure 3 which I have replicated in Figure 4.22 It may help to think of the fringe as a single
firm, the "fringe firm". The regulator asks each firm i = m, f to submit a demand schedule,
21A good description of VCG mechanisms can be found in Milgrom (2004).
22Note that the auction scheme in Montero (2008) can be easily extended to the case in which the total number
of permits to be allocated to firms is endogenous to firms’ bidding schedules and the pollution damage to third
parties.
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say Pˆi(ei), and then clears the auction by allocating eˆi permits to firm i at price
pˆ = Pˆi(eˆi) for all i
where eˆm + eˆf = e0. To make sure that firm i bids its true demand curve, its final payment
is not pˆeˆi, as in a standard uniform-price auction, but pˆeˆi minus a rebate specific to i. The
rebate is calculated by constructing a residual supply function for each firm i, which is obtained
by substracting from the overall supply of permits (e0 in Figure 4) the sum of the schedules
submitted by the remaining firms, so it is independent of firm i’s bid. For example, if by any
reason, the "fringe firm" bids truthfully, i.e., Pˆf (ef ) = Pf (ef ), the large firm’s residual supply
curve would be Sf (e) in Figure 4. The residual supply function captures the (marginal) cost to
the fringe firm from allocating permits to the large firm (as perceived by the fringe firm). So, if
we want the large firm to bid truthfully we must make it bear the full social cost of allocating
permits to it. The rebate must be such that the large firm ends up paying exactly this social
cost.
Suppose that the large firm does not bid its true demand curve but something higher, say
Pˆm(em) = Pmf (e) in Figure 4. The auction will clear at pˆ > p∗ and the large firm will get
eˆm permits. The large firm’s final payment Fm(eˆm) would be the area under Sf (e) from 0 to
eˆm, which means that its payback would be the shaded area in the figure, i.e., the diﬀerence
between the uniform-price payment pˆeˆm and the final payment Fm(eˆm). Thus, the large firm’s
compliance cost when bidding Pˆm(em) = Pmf (e) would be Fm(eˆm) plus the (true) cost of
reducing emissions from u to eˆm. We do not need to extend the analysis here to the case of
under-reporting to see that the large firm reaches its lowest compliance cost when it bids its
true demand curve, i.e., Pˆm(em) = Pm(em). In this case the auction will clear at p∗ with a final
payment equal the area under Sf (e) from 0 to e∗. Regardless of what the fringe firm does, the
large firm does best by bidding its true demand curve. Furthermore, the large firm wants to
participate at the auction rather than waiting for the resale market.
As formally shown in Montero (2008), the auction mechanism retains its first-best properties
even when a group of (or all) firms form a cartel. Since permits are by definition fully transfer-
able in resale markets, cartel firms mimic a single entity at the auction and then proceed with
eﬃcient permits transfers among themselves. One of the cartel firms –the serious bidder–
submits the cartel true demand curve while the remaining cartel firms submit empty demand
schedules. Note that in the perfectly inelastic case of Figure 4, the serious bidder would submit
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a lower demand schedule just enough to get the e0 permits at zero price. But in this particular
case under-reporting does not produce any eﬃciency loss.
Despite being eﬃcient and strategy-proof, the auction mechanism may still face resistance
from aﬀected parties since, unlike the free allocation, it leaves rents with the regulator. The
auction scheme is, like any other VCG mechanism, a non-budget-balanced mechanism, i.e., we
cannot return the totality of the auction revenues to firms without aﬀecting their reporting
incentives. In Montero (2008), I propose a partial solution to the problem. Let F−ij (e
−i
j ) denote
the final payment that firm j would have hypothetically faced under the same auction scheme
but in the absence of firm i, where e−ij is the corresponding number of permits allocated to
j. The regulator can thus fashion a lump-sum additional refunding Ri for firm i using these
influence-free hypothetical payments. For example,
Ri =
1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
F−ij (e
−i
j ) (7)
This solution assures a perfectly balanced budget (i.e.,
Pn
i=1Ri =
Pn
i=1 Fi(ei)) only in the
limiting case of a large number of firms. I will now develop a numerical application to further
illustrate the workings of the auction scheme including theses additional refunding.
5.2 An Application to Water Pollution
Beyond solving the price manipulation problem, a well-designed auction scheme may be par-
ticularly appealing in environments with few firms and infrequent transactions. Trading water
pollution rights is a good example as demonstrated by the disappointing experience in the early
1980s of the Fox River in northern Wisconsin. Despite the supposedly large gains from trading,
only a single trade between a municipal wastewater plant and a paper mill has been documented
(Tietenberg, 2006).
Our numerical exercise applies to two wastewater treatment plants (Essbio Nacimiento and
Essbio Negrete) and three pulp and paper mills (Inforsa, Forestal Santa Fe and Celpac Mininco)
discharging biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) along an 18 kilometers section of the Bio-Bio
River in southern Chile. Following Saavedra (2002), the regulator’s objective is to maintain the
level of dissolved oxygen (DO) in the river equal or above 8.35 mg/lts at some chosen control
point, which is located 18 kms downstream from the furthest away source. Table 3 summarizes
firms’ characteristics: di is the distance between source i and the control point, q0i is i’s waste
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mass discharge in the absence of regulation in kg/day, vi is the flow of water carrying the waste
in m3/sec, the ratio q0i /vi is unrestricted BOD discharge in mg/lts, and Pi(qi) is firm i’s demand
for mass discharges at its location (i.e., marginal abatement cost). As explained by Saavedra
(2002), a firm can reduce its BOD only by reducing its mass discharge qi, not by increasing its
flow vi, which is already at its maximum level.23
I calculate the impact of individual discharges on DO at the control point with a simple
linear model, which is
DO = DO0 −A
5X
i=1
qi
vidi
where DO0 is the DO level in the absence of any BOD discharges (9 mg/lts) and A is a
conversion factor (9.4866). In the absence of regulation, the level of DO at the control point
would fall to 5.27 mg/lts, way below the 8.35 mark. A traditional approach for the regulator to
reach its DO goal is to impose a uniform BOD standard of 35 mg/lts.24 As shown in Table 4,
total compliance costs under this command-and-control (CAC) approach would be 11.7 million
dollars per year. Since firms are heterogeneous in terms of location d and water flow v, it is
not immediately obvious from looking at the diverging marginal costs faced by each firm, i.e.,
Pi(qi), to see how cost-eﬀective or ineﬀective this CAC approach is.
Since the regulator does not know firms’ demand curves, he cannot implement the cost-
eﬀective solution by imposing diﬀerent BOD standards on firms.25 But the VCG auction scheme
proposed in Montero (2008) does precisely that in a decentralized manner and in dominant
strategies. The results are summarized in Table 5. Total compliance costs under the auction
scheme are 6.2 million dollars: 3.8 millions coming from abatement costs –only 32% of the
CAC cost– and 2.5 millions from permit purchasing costs. From looking at the diﬀerence
between the uniform-price payments (piqi) and the final payments (Fi), we see that paybacks
vary widely from 38 dollars in the case of Essbio Negrete to 577,913 dollars in the case of
Inforsa. Essbio Negrete is the smallest source so it faces an almost perfectly elastic residual
supply curve while Inforsa faces a much less elastic residual supply curve. Interestingly, this
latter firm is the only one that sees its compliance costs increase when moving from CAC to
23To work with interior solutions I let demand curves to be perfectly inelastic at qi = 0.05q0i . In other words,
it becomes prohibitely costly to reduce beyond 95%.
24 In fact, the 8.35 mg/lts goal was obtained from requiring each source to discharge no more than 35 mg/lts of
BOD; which is the standard authorities have previously used to regulate pollution in other rivers in the country.
25Even if the regulator had a good idea of firms’ marginal cost curves, it would be politically impossible to
imagine a regulator with the discretion to impose diﬀerent standards across sources based on his information on
marginal costs.
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the auction scheme.
We can now use the lump-sum refundings, Ri, of expression (7) to reduce firms’ compliance
costs even further. As shown in the last column of Table 5, with this additional refunding total
permit purchasing costs have decreased to just 10 percent of total abatement costs; almost
replicating a cost-eﬀective free allocation of permits. And as with any free allocation of permits,
it is not surprising that some sources may end-up profiting from the regulation.26
6 SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
There are several grandfathering permit markets in which market power has never been an issue;
for example, the U.S. EPA trading program initiated in the 1980s (Tietenberg, 1985 and 2006),
the Santiago’s particulate market (Montero et al., 2002) and the E.U. emissions trading system
(Ellerman and Joskow, 2008). The first instance of a permits market in which all of the permits
are auctioned oﬀ has recently taken oﬀ in the U.S. Northeast under the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Innitiative (RGGI). The auction format adopted by RGGI is a sealed-bid, uniform-price.
All four auctions that have been conducted so far have cleared at relatively low prices. For
example, the last auction, held on June 17, 2009, cleared at $3.23 for 2009 vintage allowances.
According to Potomac Economics, a consultant, these low prices reflect supply and demand
fundamentals (i.e., low-binding cap) and not collusion or manipulation by bidders.27 While it
is diﬃcult to think of collusion with more than 50 bidders (although 56% of the allowances
went to just 4 bidders), we cannot just rule out the possibility of unilateral manipulation a la
Wilson (1979).28
There are two existing (grandfathering) programs for which there is more detailed analy-
sis and data to take a closer look at the problem; these are the U.S. sulfur market and the
Southern California NOx market. Let us look at the sulfur market first. With entirely diﬀerent
methodologies, the works of Ellerman and Montero (2007) and Liski and Montero (2009a) oﬀer
26Note also that Inforsa is still worse oﬀ with the move from CAC to the auction scheme; but in the absence of
complete information about other firms’ characteristics no firm can anticipate that so as to oppose the regulatory
move.
27See http://www.rggi.org/docs/Auction_4_News_Release_MM_Report.pdf
28The market for trading summer NOx permits in the Northeast region of the US –known as the Ozono
Transport Commission (OTC) market– is also an interesting case. Although there is no evidence of market
power in the OTC market itself, Mansur (2007) explains that some electric companies that trade in the OTC
market do have market power in their (restructed) energy markets. And since pollution intensity varies across
plants, this market power has had an eﬀect on the performance of the OTC market in terms of clearing prices
and cost-eﬀectiveness.
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no indication of market power, at least in the form considered in this paper. Using aggregate
data from 1995 through 2003, Ellerman and Montero (2007) find that the actual emissions path
is reasonably close to a simulated path of perfect competition. In the static setting of Hahn,
total emissions provide no information on the extent of market power (obviously, individual
emissions do). But in the dynamic setting of the sulfur market, any indication of market power
must show up in a distorted emissions path, as discussed in Section 4.
Liski and Montero (2009a), on the other hand, use publicly available data on emissions and
permit allocations to track down the actual compliance paths of the four largest players in the
market, which together account for 43% of the permits allocated during the generous-allocation
years of the program, i.e., 1995-1999. The fact that these players, taken either individually or
as a cohesive group, appear as heavy buyers of permits during and after 2000, practically rules
out, according to their theory (see Section 4), market power coming from the initial allocations
of permits. They further comment on a second piece of evidence, based on trading activity, that
reinforces their finding that market power is less of a problem in the sulfur market. According to
their theory, a large agent exercising buyer-power will never sell permits in the market because
this would only move forward the arrival of the long-run equilibrium. They explain, however,
that the EPA allowance tracking system shows significant sales by the large buyers.29
Note however, that neither of these two studies constitute a formal test of market power
(a test comparing prices and marginal abatement costs). It is certainly an interesting area for
future research estimating marginal cost curves from publicly available data such as prices and
emissions and then comparing those cost figures to actual prices. Finding evidence of market
power (i.e., departure from marginal cost pricing) under such a test would open up an entirely
new set of theoretical questions as to what could explain the presence of market power beyond
that attributed to the initial allocation of permits.
The California NOx market provides less conclusive evidence. Taking advantage of the
intertemporal linkages in its design, Holland and Moore (2008) test whether the theoretical
predictions of a perfectly competitive model are consistent with the actual data on permits and
emissions. They verify that facilities do trade intertemporally as permitted by two overlapping
cycles of permits; the pattern of permits use, however, is not entirely consistent with their
predictions. For example, they find some facilities holding too many permits. The authors do
29They indicate that by the end of year 2000, American Electric Power had sold about 1.1 million of current-
vintage allowances and Southern Company about 1.5 million.
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not go on explaining what could be causing the discrepancy between theory and actual data;
so I can only speculate that market power may have something to do with it.
Kolstad and Wolak (2008) also look at the NOx market but from a diﬀerent angle. Nearly
25% of the NOx permits were allocated to facilities that sell power into the California electricity
market, which has been recognized for its (unilateral) market power problems, particularly
during the summer of 2000 (e.g., Borenstein et al. 2002; Joskow and Kahn, 2002). Kolstad and
Wolak (2008) explore the extent to which electric utilities used the NOx market to enhance
their ability to exercise (unilateral) market power in the electricity market. They find that
above average NOx permit prices during 2000 and 2001 were primarily used by electricity
generators to cost-justify higher bids into the electricity market that would set higher prices
for all electricity they produced. Given the fact that electricity was historically regulated,
privately owned generators may have inferred that they could be required to "cost justify"
their bids ex post to a regulator. In a NOx market of ample price dispersion,30 it seems then
that generators were purposefully looking for higher NOx prices that could be uncontestedly
passed onto electricity prices. But if this is the case, the following question remains: how could
a generator justify to be systematically at the higher end of the price range?
There is an alternative explanation that one could put forward. In a world where prices
do not follow the law of one price, as in the sulfur market (Joskow et al., 2008), but rather
they are the result of bilateral transactions, it is possible to think that in their rush to deliver
electricity at high prices, generators had a lower bargaining power than permit buyers in other
industries. This explanation, however, would not be entirely consistent with the authors’ finding
that changes in NOx prices do not aﬀect generators’ bidding behavior in the same way as do
changes in other fuel prices. In any case, the kind of permit market manipulation advanced by
Kolstad and Wolak (2008) is unrelated to the raising rival’s cost strategy discussed in Section
3. It does not even require firms to be large in the permits market. It requires a thin permit
market with poor arbitrage conditions and firms subject to some sort of regulatory oversight
that prevents them to bid freely in the output market. All this makes the case very specific to
California.
30Year 2000 witnessed a significant increase in the standard deviation of transaction prices for 2000 and 2001
vintage permits.
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7 FINAL REMARKS
I have reviewed the literature on market power in pollution permit trading and contributed with
some new results and ideas. It seems that our good understanding in the case of a dominant
(or strategic) agent playing against a fringe of polluting agents it is not easily exportable to
the case of multiple strategic agents. Some of the approaches being proposed are not entirely
satisfactory in part because of the multiplicity of equilibria. It also seems diﬃcult to come up
with general theoretical predictions on how imperfectly competitive permits and output markets
interact; they depend to a large extent on the specifics of each case. When we move to dynamic
markets in which firms build up and exhaust stocks of (storable) permits, we find an important
asymmetry not present in the static case. A large buyer of permits has great diﬃculties in
exercising market power because of a commitment problem, very much like the durable-good
monopoly. Conversely, a large seller uses the market dynamics to extend its market power
by following a more gradual selling path. In moving from grandfather allocations to auction
allocations, properly designed auction schemes can greatly alleviate market power problems as
long as they create incentives for wide participation and truthful bidding. Finally, an empirical
revision of the functioning of past and existing permit markets shows no indication of market
power that can be of concern.
Let me oﬀer a few concluding thoughts on related topics not covered by the paper. There
are other environmental markets that may share some of the properties of the pollution mar-
kets reviewed here. Amundsen and Nese (2004), for example, discuss how the interaction of
an imperfectly competitive market of green certificates (GC) with an imperfectly competitive
electricity market can produce unexpected outcomes like fixed GC prices. Based on this results,
the authors argue the GC market may well be replaced by a plain subsidy for green power. I am
curious if any of the results of Amundsen and Nese (2004) can be applied to pollution markets
(that interact with output markets).
In addition, the paper has been developed as if all transactions occurs in spot markets. In
view of the diﬀerent type of market transactions that we observe in more recent permit markets,
it is natural to ask whether and how our analysis would change if we extended the scope of
the market to cover forward transactions. The demand for forward transactions typically arises
due to the need to share risk among market participants, but it is well known that oligopolistic
firms can also choose to enter the forward market due to strategic reasons (Allaz and Vila,
1993). Forward contracting of production provides a commitment to a future market share, but
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leads to a prisoners’ dilemma type of situation where firms end up behaving more competitively
than without forward markets. Liski and Montero (2006), however, show that the existence of
forward markets increases the scope for collusive outcomes in an oligopolistic setting (i.e., two
or more large firms), if the traded good is reproducible and interaction is repeated over time.
Finally, the paper is also silent in comparing the permit trading instrument to alternative
instruments such as taxes in the presence of imperfectly competitive markets and imperfectly
informed regulators. If the regulator were to use the linear instruments of Weitzman (1974), i.e.,
plain free allocated permits and linear taxes, the answer is quite obvious. The price instrument
is superior to the quantity instrument because it does not give up its cost-eﬀectiveness. But
this advantage can be eliminated if permits are auctioned oﬀ in a cost-eﬀective manner, that
is, in a manner that firms bid truthfully.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium price path for a large seller of storable permits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Time-consistency problem for a buyer of permits 
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Figure 3. A large firm that disregards the auction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. A large firm that bids truthfully 
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Table 1. Permit Trading with Perfect and Imperfect Output Competition  
 
am = 1 
af = 1 
am = 1.5 
af = 0.5 
am = 0.5 
af = 1.5 
 PCO/MPP MPO/MPP PCO/MPP MPO/MPP PCO/MPP MPO/MPP
ym 2 1.714 2.083 1.787 1.917 1.642 
yf 2 2.057 1.917 1.975 2.083 2.140 
qm 1 0.714 0.917 0.617 1.083 0.811 
qf 1 1.057 1.083 1.144 0.917 0.970 
xm 0 0 0.333 0.333 -0.333 -0.333 
p 2 2.114 2.167 2.289 1.833 1.940 
R 6 6.229 6 6.238 6 6.219 
Notes: PCO = perfect competition in the output market; MPP = market power in the permits market; MPO = 
market power in the output market. 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. Subgame Perfect Monopsony and Monopoly Solutions 
Equilibrium Path Initial Price Terminal Time Welfare Loss 
Perfectly Competitive 0.449 8.0 0 
Monopsony 0.429 8.5 7% 
Monopoly 0.694 9.5 28% 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Firms’ Characteristics 
Source’s name di qi0 vi BOD0 = qi0/vi Pi(qi) 
 kms kg/day m3/day mg/lts $/kg/day 
Essbio Nacimiento 1.1 1,069 5,873 182 83.4 – 0.0780q 
Inforsa 1.4 7,714 31,104 248 1248.2 – 0.1618q 
Forestal Santa Fe 4.5 10,977 69,915 157 866.3 – 0.0789q 
Celpac Mininco 17.7 4,873 46,855 104 4863.9 – 0.9981q 
Essbio Negrete 18.0 350 1,923 182 154.6 – 0.4418q 
Source: Saavedra (2002). Definition of variables in the text 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Costs and Allocations under a Uniform BOD Standard 
Source’s name BOD = qi/vi Pi(qi) abat. cost
 mg/lts $/kg/day $/year
Essbio Nacimiento 35 67.4 29,075
Inforsa 35 1072.1 3,551,379
Forestal Santa Fe 35 673.1 2,870,937
Celpac Mininco 35 3226.0 5,216,527
Essbio Negrete 35 124.9 17,654
Total   11,685,572
 
 
 
Table 5. Costs and Allocations under the Auction Scheme 
Source’s name qi BOD pi = Pi(qi) abat. cost pi⋅qi Fi Fi - Ri 
 kg/day mg/lts $/permit $/year $/year $/year $/year 
Essbio Nacimiento 53 9 7,225 40,221 386,194 376,093 -135,225
Inforsa 1,089 35 1,072 3,550,539 1,167,786 589,873 584,389
Forestal Santa Fe 9,097 130 148 139,498 1,349,591 1,221,393 830,030
Celpac Mininco 4,817 103 56 1,589 271,091 266,112 -298,731
Essbio Negrete 18 9 1,349 24,422 23,599 23,561 -590,680
Total  3,756,270 3,198,261 2,477,033 389,784
 
 
